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place-hunting. At Paris, at the peace conference with Spain, and at London, Reid showed the same assurance that guided his pen in the editorial office. His career does much to reconcile one to the American habit of picking ambassadors outside the diplomatic corps. Few Americans of Reid's day had a more successful life, or deserved it more.

FREDERIC L. PAXSON.

How America Went to War. By BENEDICT CROWELL, Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions, 1917-1920, and ROBERT FORREST WILSON, formerly Captain, U. S. A. In six volumes. I. *The Giant Hand: our Mobilization and Control of Industry and Natural Resources, 1917-1918*; II., III. *The Road to France: The Transportation of Troops and Military Supplies, 1917-1918.* (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. xxx, 191; xi, 307; 311-675. Set of six vols. \$42.00.)

THESE volumes are the first three of a series of six being published under the general title *How America went to War*, and which a subtitle declares to be "an account from official sources of the Nation's war activities, 1917-1920". The real aim of the series seems to be less ambitious, though the matter is left uncertain, since the preface declares that all the volumes except the first, which deals with the War Industries Board, are concerned with activities most of which fell within the administrative province of the Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions, who is, incidentally, a co-author. Another prefatory sentence announces, furthermore, that the story presented comes not only from the official documents and files, but also from the memories of the men who did the work. These circumstances are worth noting, because they furnish a clue both to the incompleteness of the volume as a comprehensive account of the enterprises described, and to the subjective and superficial nature of many of the comments on events and personalities.

In fairness it should be stated that the intention apparently has been to produce a narrative account of our participation which would appeal to the general reader. From this standpoint the three volumes are reasonably successful. In few places is the reading hard, and some chapters, such as those on conveying, camouflage, and submarine adventures, are distinctly interesting. The volumes are, furthermore, well printed, and the illustrations are excellent.

The first volume, dealing with the War Industries Board, gives a general idea of the board's functions, organization, and personnel. The foreword embodies a sharp attack on the President, Secretary of War, and the War Department for failure to take suitable steps in anticipation of our entrance into the war, and for lack of proper organi-

zation and sufficient vigor during our participation in the year 1917. The thesis is developed that if the results of our industrial war effort were disappointing, the cause was the administration's failure to order the goods in time, and that there was no failure of industry itself. While the administration must bear the full responsibility for its deficiencies, it would seem that the authors' judgments of industry are too laudatory. No mention is made, for example, of the airplane fiasco, which certainly was not chargeable to a lack of ordering by the administration, nor of ill-advised policies—such as "business as usual", advocated late in 1917 by certain business leaders.

One cannot help feeling, furthermore, that the volume suffers from a too-great reliance on interviews with the persons involved, each of whom is depicted as about the happiest choice possible for his job. A greater number, and a more diversified selection of points of view, might have been drawn on with advantage, and a more critical attitude might well have been taken toward the information elicited.

The second and third volumes, jointly called *The Road to France*, deal with the transportation of troops and military supplies. The preface to these volumes, in the course of some rather remarkable phraseology, manages to convey the impression that transportation was in some substantial manner a function of the Assistant Secretary of War. This impression surely is misleading. The volume starts with a forced and unfair comparison between the early embarkations of troops during the Spanish War, and the routine movement established in 1918 after approximately a year's experience. Not until the reader has gone further does he begin to discover that the first embarkations in 1917 were conducted under conditions of confusion rivalling those of the earlier war.

Part I. of *The Road to France*, entitled "The Land", describes the railroad movement of troops and freight in this country. The account is interesting, and gives a good general idea of how the thing came off, although it is not without those defects of method noted in connection with *The Giant Hand*. A chapter is inserted endorsing the work of the Railroad Administration.

Part II., "The Port", deals with handling of troops at the ports, and with the organizations of the Embarkation Service. Here the reader should accept many of the statements regarding responsibility and credit with extreme reserve, since the emphasis has been distributed in a very doubtful manner. This condition probably arose innocently and as a result of the method used in collecting the information. A striking example in point, however, is that in no part of the account of overseas transportation, or in any of the three volumes under review, for that matter, is any mention made of General March, although Secretary Weeks, in accepting the general's request for retirement, wrote, on June 14, 1921: "I especially wish to mention your success in directing the transportation of troops to Europe during the war, which was a service

of great magnitude and in which you accomplished really remarkable results." It is also doubtful if the statement on page 241, to the effect that the Embarkation Service and its director were the decisive factor in the acquisition of the Dutch tonnage, can be accepted without proof.

Part III, "The Sea", contains interesting chapters on the navy's part in the movement, convoying, the preparation of the troop fleet, and the Shipping Control Committee. A decidedly one-sided view of the functions of the latter is presented, a surprising omission being the absence of any reference to the War Trade Board's large part in determining what commodities the committee should haul. The account also goes too far in conveying an impression that the army's needs were satisfactorily met, omitting to mention, for example, the shortages in the shipment of trucks and animals, which were made manifest during the Argonne struggle. Credit is also given the Embarkation Service for studies of ocean-trade and shipping conditions which actually were made by the Shipping Board and the War Trade Board. The accounts of our dealings with the Allied Maritime Transport Council border, in places, on the fanciful. The three volumes, in fact, display a tendency to detract from the British attitude and accomplishments, which is in decidedly poor taste. On page 330 this reaches the ridiculous in a grotesque statistical comparison of troop-ship performance.

Altogether it is difficult to know just how to place these volumes. They might win recommendation as a popular account of our part in the war were it not for the errors, omissions, and distortions to which the reader would be exposed. Certainly they cannot be accepted as a well-balanced, critical examination of our effort. The fundamental defect is a too ready and enthusiastic acceptance of stories derived from too few of the principal figures involved.

F. SCHNEIDER, JR.

MINOR NOTICES

La Doctrine Scholastique du Droit de Guerre. Par Alfred Vanderpol. (Paris, A. Pedone, 1919, pp. xxviii, 534.) The present work, in which the author aims to show the traditional and, in a certain sense, unvarying, character of the Christian doctrine on war, is divided into three parts. Part I. gives an exposé of the scholastic doctrine on war under the following headings: is war permitted to Christians?; the legitimacy of war; the definition of just war; the just cause; the authority necessary to declare war; the right intention; obligations of princes and subjects; consequences of the doctrine and the rights of the victor.

This part is itself written in the scholastic style. Objections are answered first, and then the proper principles are briefly and clearly laid down, supported by abundant and judiciously selected excerpts from the Fathers of the Church, the theologians, and the canonists.

Part II. outlines the history of the scholastic doctrine on war from